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ABSTRACT 
Firms can change their outstanding shares to manage their stock price levels. Those 
with lower stock prices tend to attract more speculative trading, which causes higher price 
volatility and may force their managers to excessively focus on short-term earnings at the 
expense of R&D and other long-term projects. Thus, I hypothesize that keeping high stock 
price levels allows firms to (i) limit speculative traders’ influences on stock prices and thus 
mitigate investor short-termism, and (ii) enhance R&D productivity. Indeed, I find that high-
priced firms are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline, less likely to fire their 
CEOs, and have more innovation. All these findings are robust after controlling for 
institutional ownership, a factor that has been shown in the literature to have a correlation 
with share price and also have a significant impact on R&D policies and innovation. For 
robustness checks, I examine stock splits, which allow mangers to re-set their stock price 
levels, and IPOs in which managers set an offering price range before shares are publicly 
traded. Consistent with my hypothesis, I discover that innovative firms are less likely to split 
their stocks, and that innovation declines after firms split their stocks. Furthermore, IPO 
firms that set higher offering prices, not those that attract more institutional ownership, have 
more future innovation. Thus, the results imply that, rather than being “forced” or “assured” 
by institutional investors to innovate as the extant literature suggests, managers of innovative 
firms actively support high stock price levels to foster innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
It is a common impression that institutional investors play a positive role in the 
governance of innovation in public traded companies. One reason, as Hall and Lerner (2009) 
suggest, is that institutional investors can better deal with the asymmetric information 
problems related to R&D. Also, Bushee (1998) shows that firms with more institutional 
ownership are less inclined to cut R&D following poor short-term earnings performance, 
suggesting that institutional investors tend to have long-term views on the firms they invest 
in. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) further contrast two hypotheses—the lazy 
manager hypothesis in which managers prefer a quiet life and institutional investors’ 
monitoring forces them to innovate, and the career concern hypothesis in which managers 
dislike the risk in pursuing innovation and institutional investors provide incentives for 
managers to innovate by reassuring their job security if bad outcomes occur. Their evidence 
favors the latter hypothesis.  
However, one drawback of this line of inquiry is that managers are assumed to play a 
passive role. Specifically, managers seem need to be “forced” or “assured” by institutional 
investors to innovate as if they are not in control of corporate strategies. Another drawback is 
the assumption that institutional investors seemingly like the risk of innovation. Given that 
institutions’ primary goal is to make money for their stakeholders, the risk of innovation 
could compromise that goal. Hence, institutional investors should dislike the risk of 
innovation as well, even though the extent of their dislike could be reduced (but would not 
disappear) by their informational advantage over retail investors which allows institutional 
investors to select firms that are better able to innovate, and by the size of their portfolios, 
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which allows them to diversify away some risk of innovation in firms they select to invest. 
Therefore, there is a need to rethink the role of managers in innovation and the role of 
institutional ownership in the governance of innovation. 
This rethinking leads to a subtle factor ignored in the previous studies, namely stock 
price level, which is highly correlated to institutional ownership. As Dyl and Elliott (2006) 
point out, firms with more investor recognition (e.g., large firms and those that can attract 
more institutional investors) tend to keep higher stock price levels. They also note that 
managers take actions to set price levels for their stocks (i.e., by manipulating the number of 
shares outstanding, such as stock splits, stock dividends, and share buybacks). According to 
Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010), firms that set lower stock price levels tend to 
attract more speculative trading by retail investors and result in higher price volatility. Taken 
together, these findings imply a simple price-setting framework in which (i) managers are 
risk averse and dislike the high price volatility induced by speculative trading, and (ii) they 
prefer to set a high stock price level to preclude speculative traders from their investor base. 
The idea echoes Warren Buffett’s explanation in his 1983 Chairman’s letter to shareholders 
for why Berkshire Hathaway did not split its stock: “We try to attract investors who will 
understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And, fully as important, we try to 
dissuade those who won’t.) […] Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small 
minority …”1 
                                                          
1
 Warren Buffett also noted in his 1983 Chairman’s letter that “If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the 
prospective buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotion-based decisions, some pretty silly 
stock prices are going to appear periodically.  Manic-depressive personalities produce manic-depressive 
valuations.  Such aberrations may help us in buying and selling the stocks of other companies.  But we think it 
is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence in the market for Berkshire… In large part, 
however, we feel that high quality ownership can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate 
our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other conflicting messages - and then let self selection 
follow its course.” See http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1983.html  
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Thus, under the framework, a firm would keep its stock price at a high level when a 
sufficient number of long-term investors find the firm attractive and willing to invest their 
money with the intention of staying for a long time. Conversely, if the firm cannot attract 
enough long-term investors, it needs to keep its stock price at a relatively low level in order 
to attract short-term investors, who prefer to take smaller (risky) positions and tend to have 
more speculative trading than long-term investors. Consequently, a firm’s stock price level 
could be informative about the characteristics of its investor base.  
The price-setting framework leads to the following questions: Could managers set a 
high stock price level to mitigate investor short-termism? If yes, high stock price could 
function like institutional ownership in the governance of innovation, as previous studies 
have suggested. By setting a high stock price level, do the firm increase R&D productivity 
and innovate more? If yes, setting a high stock price level could play a prominent role in 
enhancing innovation. Given that firms  that attract more institutional investors tend to set a 
higher price level, to what extent is the effect of institutional ownership on innovation, as 
documented in the literature, derived from its correlation with stock price level? Can stock 
price level subsume the effect of institutional ownership on innovation? The last two 
questions directly compare institutional ownership and stock price levels in horse races to see 
which one is a better measure to guard against short-termism and foster innovation. 
The prices of high-priced stocks behave very differently from those of low-priced 
stocks. Brandt et al. (2010) demonstrate that the positive trend of idiosyncratic volatility in 
the 1990s and early 2000s in U.S. markets (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001) and the 
reversal of the volatility trend in more recent years are largely driven by short-term 
speculative trading by retail investors on low-priced stocks. Their findings illustrate that 
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short-term speculative trading on low-priced stocks is forceful and has a profound effect on 
their price volatility. Short-term speculative trading is detrimental to firm innovation because 
it can force managers to excessively focus on short-term earnings at the expense of long-term 
interests. In contrast, higher-priced stocks have lower price volatility, reflecting that they 
tend to attract more long-term investors. Thus, I hypothesize that keeping high stock price 
levels allows firms to (i) limit speculative traders to influencing stock prices and thus to 
mitigate investor short-termism, and (ii) enhance the productivity of R&D investments. 
Consistent with this hypothesis I find that it is high-priced firms, not those with high 
institutional ownership as Bushee (1998) claims, which are less likely to cut R&D to reverse 
an earnings decline. Similarly, unlike Aghion et al.’s (2013) argument that firms with higher 
institutional ownership are more likely to keep their CEOs in the face of profit downturns, it 
is high-priced firms that are less likely to oust their CEOs. That is, once I control for stock 
price, the effects of institutional ownership on firms’ R&D policies and CEO firing 
disappear, suggesting that the property of institutional ownership mitigating short-termism 
identified in the extant literature is largely derived from its correlation with stock price level. 
Of course, with additional information, such as portfolio turnover and momentum 
trading suggested by Bushee (1998), one can classify institutions into long-term investors 
and short-term investors. One can also similarly classify individual investors into the two 
groups. In general, long-term investors are more likely to stick by the firm when temporary 
setbacks in the innovation process occur, allowing firms to pursue R&D projects that have 
high rewards and also high risk of failure. My findings imply that firms keeping higher stock 
price levels tend to attract more long-term investors, and that having higher institutional 
ownership is a mixed bag in which short-term institutional investors’ interest in short-term 
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profits appears to offset the contributions of long-term institutional investors, making 
institutional ownership as a whole ineffective in enhancing innovation. 
To analyze firm innovation, I follow Aghion et al. (2013) and use future citations of a 
firm’s patents to measure its innovation (or productivity of R&D investments). Based on U.S. 
firms with patent data available from 1980 to 2005, I find that high-priced firms have more 
innovation than low-priced firms, and that the effect of institutional ownership on innovation 
largely disappears in the presence of share price. The regressions estimates suggest that a 
doubling in the share price level (e.g., from $20 per share to $40 per share) during year t is 
associated with a 17.5% increase in the total citation-weighted number of patents during year 
t+2, controlling for other firm characteristics. In terms of one standard deviation increase in 
stock price level, the corresponding increase in future innovation is 12%. The numbers 
suggest that the effect of stock price level on fostering innovation is nontrivial.  
I further identify the channel through which stock price level affects innovation.
2
 
Specifically, I find that a high stock price level strengthens the relationship between 
innovation inputs (i.e., R&D capital) and innovation outputs (i.e., patent citations). In other 
words, firms investing more in R&D benefit more in innovation by setting high stock price 
level; but, it does not benefit much to those firms that invest little in R&D. The findings 
suggest that, by mitigating investor short-termism, high stock price levels improve the 
productivity of R&D investments. 
It is possible that, anticipating more future innovation by some firms, investors bid up 
their stock prices. In this case, it is innovation causing high stock price, rather than high stock 
price enhancing innovation. However, firms can decide to keep high stock price levels or 
                                                          
2
 While investing in R&D is a very important factor in pursuing innovation, firms can also acquire innovation 
through mergers and acquisitions or through buying patents from other firms. 
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split their stocks to automatically lower their stock price levels. In fact, according to Weld et 
al. (2009), many firms split their stocks to manage their stock price levels and, consequently, 
the average price for a share of stock on the NYSE has remained roughly constant at about 
$35 since the Great Depression. My hypothesis emphasizes that innovative firms are more 
likely to keep their stock price at higher levels to mitigate investor short-termism. Thus, to 
further verify the findings, I do two robustness checks. First, I investigate a sample of firms 
that split their stocks. If my hypothesis is correct we expect that (i) innovative firms are less 
likely to engage in stock splits, and (ii) if they do, innovation would decline following the 
falls in stock price levels induced by stock splits. Consistent with these predictions, I find 
that the likelihood of engaging in a stock split is lower for more innovative firms. Also, 
although stock splits tend to attract more institutional investors (see Lin, Singh, and Yu, 
2009; Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang, 2014), I also find that innovation tends to decline 
following stock splits, and declines more for firms that choose a larger split factor. 
For the second robustness check, I examine a sample of IPO firms in which managers 
set offering price ranges to sell shares to institutional investors as well as retail investors 
before their shares traded on exchanges. My hypothesis predicts that, holding other things 
constant, IPO firms that set higher offering prices (based on the midpoint of the offering 
price range) would have more future innovation. Indeed, the results show that innovation 
increases with IPO firms’ offering price levels, not institutional ownership. 
In sum, the findings suggest that high stock price levels have a function of mitigating 
investor short-termism. This function helps managers to preserve an environment for 
promoting innovation. The findings also suggest that while many firms choose to split their 
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stocks, innovative firms keep their stock price at a high level to curtail speculative trading. In 
other words, firms’ stock price levels play an important role in the governance of innovation.   
The remainder of the Dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related 
literature. Chapter 3 describes sample selection, variable measures and descriptive statistics. 
Chapter 4 compares institutional ownership and stock price levels in mitigating short-
termism. Chapter 5 investigates the effects of stock price level and institutional ownership on 
firm innovation. Chapter 6 presents two robustness checks to further verify the findings. 
Chapter 7 concludes the Dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW  
In this chapter, I first review the literature on governance mechanisms to foster 
innovation and survey studies on the role of institutional ownership in the governance of 
innovation. I also review studies on the information content of stock price level, and develop 
hypothesis to show that, like institutional ownership, stock price level can serve as a 
governance mechanism to enhance innovation.  
2.1. Governance of Innovation 
The literature on the governance of innovation has centered around three areas, 
namely (i) incentive contracts, (ii) external governance channels, and (iii) ownership 
structures. 
The first governance mechanism is through incentive contracts. Manso (2011) models 
the incentives for innovation through the trade-off between exploration of new untested ideas 
and exploitation of well-known ideas. He shows that since exploration of new untested ideas, 
which bring about innovative products, involves uncertainty and is likely to fail, the optimal 
incentive contract that motivates this innovative process needs to exhibit substantial tolerance 
for short-term failure and reward for long-term success. Even though the prediction from 
Manso’s (2011) model has received supportive evidence from empirical studies (see, Tian 
and Wang, 2014; Ederer and Manso, 2013; and Azoulay, Zivin, and Manso, 2011), designing 
incentive contracts to effectively stimulate innovation is “particularly demanding” 
(Holmstrom 1989) and might not be a good solution (Francis and Smith 1995) due to the 
high agency cost and contracting costs stemmed from the nature of the innovation process. 
9 
 
The second governance mechanism for innovation is through mergers and 
acquisitions. The theoretical literature has provided two opposite predictions on the effects of 
takeover threats on firm innovation. On one hand, takeover pressures discipline managers 
and force them to take value-enhancing projects (Jensen, 1988). The prediction from this line 
of argument is that, if more anti-takeover mechanisms are available, there will be managerial 
entrenchment (the “quiet life” effect) and therefore, a reduction in innovation. On the other 
hand, Stein (1998) shows that, under asymmetric information between firm managers and 
stock holders, takeover pressures give managers incentives to focus on short-term earnings 
and forego long-term projects. This is because poor short-term earnings may cause the stocks 
to be underpriced, thus becoming good targets for takeovers. The managerial myopia induced 
by takeover threats, therefore, impedes innovation (the “managerial myopia” effect.)3 
In testing the predictions from theoretical models, the literature has focused on the 
effects on innovation caused by the adoption of anti-takeover provisions at firm level and at 
the state level (anti-takeover laws.) At the firm level, Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter, 
and Poulsen (1990) find that firms reduced their R&D intensity after adopting anti-takeover 
provisions. This finding implies that, instead of reducing managerial myopia as predicted by 
Stein’s model, anti-takeover provisions have lead to managerial slack that is detrimental for 
innovation. Using patent activities to proxy for firm innovation, Becker-Blease (2011) and 
Chemmanur and Tian (2013), however, find that firms with larger number of takeover 
provisions adopted (i.e., higher G-index) have higher numbers of patents and patent citations 
                                                          
3
 Shleifer and Summers (1998) also come to the same conclusion that anti-takeover stimulates innovation. The 
reason is that anti-takeover facilitates long term contracting with the managers. 
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in the future, suggesting that protection from these anti-takeover provisions reduces 
managerial myopia and stimulates innovation.
4
 
At the regulatory level, Atanassov (2012) shows that during the 4-year period after a 
state passes a Business Combination anti-takeover law, firms incorporated in that state 
reduce their innovation (measured by citations per patent) by 21% relative to similar firms 
incorporated in the states that do not pass the law. Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian 
(2013) model the trade-off between expected takeover premium and expected loss of private 
benefit of control in the case of takeover. When there are little (high) takeover pressures, 
both takeover premium and loss of private control are low (high). Under these circumstances, 
firms will take innovative projects because either the expected payoff from innovative 
projects is higher or expected takeover premium is higher for innovative firms. Consistent 
with the model, they find a U-shape effect of the strength of antitakeover law on innovation. 
Specifically, firms are more innovative when antitakeover laws are weak (small state-level 
antitakeover law index) or really effective (high antitakeover law index.)
 5, 6
  
Another external governance mechanism is product market competition. There has 
also been a long debate on how product market competition would affect innovation.  The 
first strand of literature (the “Schumpeterian view”) argues that higher product market 
competition stifles innovation because it reduces the post-innovation profits, giving 
disincentives for new entrants and, therefore, reducing innovation (Schumpeter 1942). The 
“escape-competition” view, however, comes to an opposite conclusion. Under this view, 
                                                          
4
 See Gompers et al. (2003) for a description of the G-index 
5
 See Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) for a description of the state-level anti-takeover law index. 
6
 In a recent paper, Bena and Li (2014) examine how M&A activities are shaped by firm innovation 
characteristics. They find that one driver for M&As is the synergies obtained from the combination of the 
acquirers, which tend to hold large patent portfolio and low R&D, and targets, which tend to have high R&Ds 
and slow growth patent portfolio. 
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product market competition is an incentive mechanism that forces managers to innovate 
because the profits from being a leader in a neck-and-neck industry will be higher (Aghion et 
al. 2005). Empirical evidence on the relationship between product market competition and 
innovation is also inconclusive (see Cohen and Levin (1992) for a thorough review of the 
empirical evidence before 1990s and Correa and Ornaghi (2014) and Le and Vo (2014) for a 
more recent literature review). 
In sum, various theories concerning the effects of external corporate governance 
mechanisms on innovation have been proposed in the literature and they often have opposite 
views in terms of enhancing or impeding innovation. These conflicting views suggest that the 
external governance mechanisms tend to have side effects, which may explain why collective 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the external governance mechanisms on 
innovation tends to be mixed. 
Finally, shareholder structure is also an important factor in the governance of 
innovation. Francis and Smith (1995) examine the role of management holdings and outside 
block holdings on innovation and find that, due to the less effective monitoring from diffused 
shareholdings, diffuse-ownership firms are less innovative than firms with either a high 
management ownership or large equity block holders. Through a different mechanism, 
Edmans (2009) show that large block holdings foster innovation. This is because block 
holders have more incentive to gather information and get informed about the firm. 
Therefore, their trading makes share prices to reflect fundamental value rather than short-
term earnings. This encourages managers to invest in long term projects and, therefore, 
stimulate innovation. 
12 
 
Complementary to Edmans’s (2009) finding, Aghion et al. (2013) examine the role of 
shareholdings from institutional investors and find that institutional ownership (IO) fosters 
innovation. The empirical evidence from Aghion et al. (2013) suggests that the positive 
effect of IO on innovation does not come from the more effective monitoring from 
institutional investors that forces managers to innovate, as predicted by the “lazy manager” 
hypothesis. Rather, similar to Edmans (2009), it comes from the institutional investors’ 
sophisticated knowledge that allows them to access the outcome of innovation projects 
better, therefore assuring jobs for managers in the event of idiosyncratic failures (“career 
concern” hypothesis).7  
Consistent with the institutional investors’ sophistication hypothesis, Bushee (1998) 
shows that firms with high institutional ownership are less likely to cut R&D to reverse a 
decline in earnings. However, Bushee (1998) also finds that firms with a large holding by 
institutional momentum traders with high portfolio turnovers (“transient investors”) tends to 
increase the probability of reducing R&D investments to meet short term earnings. This 
evidence suggests that the pressure caused by the trading from transient investors leads to 
managerial myopic investment behavior. 
Besides the roles of institutional investors in the governance of innovation, Luong, 
Moshirian, Nguyen, Tian, and Zhang (2014) and Bena, Ferreira, and Matos (2014) examine 
the roles of foreign institutional investors on innovation. Both studies show that foreign 
institutional investors foster innovation through their monitoring and job assurance to the 
managers.
8
 
                                                          
7
 See Appendix B for a more detail review on Aghion et al.’s (2013) tests. 
8
 Public or private equity structure also has impact on innovation.  Private equity ownership allows firms to 
pursue exploration of new ideas (instead of exploitation of conventional ideas), leading to higher innovation 
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Overall, the extant literature shows that institutional ownership in general has 
significant positive impacts on firm innovation. However, this inference has one drawback. 
That is, managers are assumed to play a passive role as if they do not have a full control of 
corporate strategies since they need to be “monitored” and/or “assured” by institutional 
investors in order to pursue innovation.  Consequently, I question the inference and propose 
an alternative hypothesis about share price level to explain why institutional ownership may 
appear to have positive effects on corporate innovation. 
2.2. Share Price Level 
Stock prices of publicly traded firms are initially set by managers when firms go for 
IPOs. After IPOs, stock prices can fluctuate based on expectation about firms’ cash flows and 
by managers’ decision to split shares, a process involving a change in the total number of 
shares outstanding and a corresponding change in the share price level. There has been little 
research on the level of offering price at firm IPOs. One exception is Fernando, 
Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2004) who show that IPO share price levels increase with the 
reputation of the underwriters of the IPO firms. Besides, they show that IPO share price level 
is positively correlated with institutional ownership after the IPO, suggesting that managers 
may set a higher share price level to attract institutional investors.
9
  
On the other hand, there has been a large body of literature on stock splits, one 
common corporate event over the last several decades. The first hypothesis is that firms 
conduct stock splits to move their share price to a “normal trading range” that helps increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Ferreira, Manso, and Silva 2012). Similarly, Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) show that firms become 
more innovative after being acquired by private equity fund (public-to-private transition). 
9
 Fernando et al. (2004) discuss in details the restrictions to “penny stocks” set by stock exchanges that could 
affect managers’ choice of IPO offering price. 
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the marketability of the shares and, therefore, increase firm investor base. This hypothesis is 
in line with Merton’s (1987) incomplete information model and has received supporting 
evidence (see, e.g. Barker (1956), Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Mukherji, Kim, and Walker 
(1997), and Dyl and Elliott (2006)  for evidence on enlarged investor base after stock splits; 
and Dolley (1933) and Baker and Gallagher (1980) for surveys on CEOs about motives for 
splits). The hypothesis, however, fails to explain why the average share price level has been 
around $35 after the Great Depression (Weld et al. 2009) despite changes in incomes, 
inflations, and investor structure on the stock market over the same period. 
The second hypothesis is that managers use stock splits to convey private information 
to investors, signaling that they have a strong future performance prospect to support the 
lower post-split price level (“signaling” hypothesis). Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) examine a sample of splitting firms without other 
concurrent announcements and find that there are significantly positive announcement 
returns and also significant abnormal returns in the months subsequent to the stock 
announcement. Similar evidence is reported in other studies, for example, Asquith, Healy, 
and Palepu (1989), McNichols and Dravid (1990), and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996). 
Chemmanur et al. (2012) show that splits do facilitate information production and therefore 
reduce information asymmetry between firms and investors However, Byun and Rozeff 
(2003) and Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find a non-abnormal post-split firm performance. 
Also, Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001) find that information asymmetry does not decline 
after stock splits even though splits attract more uninformed traders. This contradicting 
evidence suggests that both signaling hypothesis and normal trading range hypothesis cannot 
satisfactorily explain stock splits. 
15 
 
There are other studies that offer different explanations on why firms choose to have 
their shares traded at some particular level. Consistent with evidence in Fernando et al. 
(2004) about IPO offering price, Dyl and Elliott (2006) provide evidence that managers set 
higher share price to attract larger investors, and lower share price to attract small or 
individual investors. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) argue that managers make 
decisions on nominal share price level by responding to changes in investors’ demand on 
shares with different price levels. Using the difference in the average market-to-book ratio of 
low-priced and high-priced firms to capture low-price premium, they show that firms are 
likely to split shares or set lower IPO offering price when the low-price premium is high. On 
the other hand, Brennan and Hughes (1991) links share price level with the supply of 
information. In their model, firms will conduct stock splits to facilitate information 
production about the firms. The information production is done through brokers whose 
commissions are based on share price, a factor that managers have control over. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, they show that the number of analysts following a firm is inversely 
related to share price level. Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2012) also present similar 
evidence on the negative relationship of share price and analysts following. Fernando et al. 
(2012) additionally show that firms with more benefits from institutional monitoring relative 
to benefits from analyst coverage will set higher share price level. Recently, Chan, Li, Lin, 
and Lin (2013) examine the reasons for firms to set high share price level. They show that 
high stock price levels impede informed trading on the stocks and reduce price 
informativeness. Based on this evidence, they suggest that firms keep their share prices at 
high levels when they need less feedback from stock the market.  
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Overall, despite the large body of literature on share price levels in general and stock 
splits in particular, there is still no clear answer to the questions of why share price matters to 
investors, why firms split their shares, and why managers appear to manage the trading price 
level of their shares on the stock markets. The nominal share price after all remains a 
“puzzle”. 10 
2.3. Institutional Investor’s Preference of High Price Shares 
Kumar (2009) show that small-priced stocks have “lottery” features in that they 
require very small investment for each share, and they have small possibility of getting very 
high return in the future. For this reason, low-priced shares with lottery features attract retail 
investors who like to “gamble” the stock market. Related to Kumar’s (2009) evidence of the 
retail investors’ preference on low-priced stocks, institutional investors have been well-
known for their preference in high-priced stocks and avoidance of low-priced stocks. The 
first reason is because institutional investors, as fiduciaries, may face restrictions on the types 
of shares they can invest in (“prudent-man law”). Del Guercio (1996) investigates the 
restrictions from this law for different types of institutional investors (banks, pension funds, 
mutual funds) and finds that banks do follow the law, meaning that they invest in high 
quality stocks. Badrinath, Gay, and Kale (1989) also show evidence of prudence investment 
of non-banks institutions. Second, institutional investors are not financially constrained as 
individual investors, so they can afford high-priced shares with a large number of shares. 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) provide evidence that institutional investors invest significantly 
more in high price stocks. So overall, there appears to be a strong positive relationship 
between share price level and institutional ownership.   
                                                          
10
 See Weld et al. (2009) for a more complete review on share price “puzzle”. 
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CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLES MEASURES AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. Sample Selection and Variable Measures 
The paper data samples come from several sources. I first start with Compustat 
annual file. Following the literature, I construct the following key variables for my analyses. 
First, I use share price at fiscal yearend (PRCC_F) to proxy for share price level.
11
 Next, I 
use log(SALES) to proxy for firm size; and calculate R&D stock (RDC) as R&D capital 
depreciated at 20% rate per year (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001). Specifically, for 
each year t, 
RDCt = R&Dt + 0.8*R&Dt-1 + 0.6*R&Dt-2 + 0.4*R&Dt-3 + 0.2 * R&Dt-4 
where R&Dt is R&D expenditure in year t.
12
 Also, I measure Capital-labor ratio (K/L) as Net 
Property, Plant, and Equipment PPENT scaled by number of employees EMP. Definitions of 
other variables used in the paper are presented in Appendix A, which include Market-to-
Book ratio, Tobin’s Q, Dividends payment, S&P500 index membership, and Tangibility. I 
eliminate observations with stock price at fiscal yearend (PRCC_F) of less than $5 because 
such low-priced firms are usually distressed and not attractive to institutional investors. 
Following the literature I also exclude financial (SIC codes 6000s) and utilities firms (SIC 
codes 4900s) because firms in these industries must follow some specific regulations, which 
do not apply to all other firms. Observations from non-US firms (FIC is not “USA”), with 
total assets (AT) of less than $1m, or missing values in SALES or capital labor K/L ratio are 
also excluded.  
                                                          
11
 For robustness checks I use average trading price calculated from CRSP. The results are qualitatively the 
same. 
12
 In order to keep firms with zero RDC in the later analyses that use the logarithm of RDC, I add 1 to the 
originally calculated RDC value. 
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I use patent citations from the NBER patent database, updated to 2006, to proxy for 
firm innovation.
13
 According to Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001 and 2005), there is a lag 
about two years between a patent’s application date and its grant date. Hence, following the 
literature, I focus on a firm’s patent applications that had ultimately been granted, weighted 
by the number of future citations, to measure its innovation. To address the truncation issue 
with the citations data I adjust the number of citations by the adjustment factor, HJTWT, 
provided in the NBER patent database.
14
 This future citations weighted patent measure, 
which reflects the productivity of innovation, has certain advantages. First, unlike R&D, 
which is innovative inputs and involves uncertainty, patents are realized technologies that 
could affect future operating performance. Second, patents measure the efficiency of 
innovation process and are publicly traded. Third, patents are a powerful tool for firms to 
maintain competitive advantages. Finally, firms can receive incomes from patent royalties.  
I obtain institutional holding data from Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum 13F 
filings for all ordinary common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). I follow Campbell, Ramadorai, and 
Schwartz (2009) to clean this database. In my calculation, there are about 6% of quarter-
stock-institution duplicated observations. I keep only the report of latest filing date (FDATE) 
for each report date. For firms with no reports from the database, I record their institutional 
holding as zero. For those with over 100% owned by institutional investors, I set the holding 
to missing to avoid the possibility of data errors. 
                                                          
13
 The data set is downloadable from https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home  
14
 A patent may receive citations many years after its grant date.  However, the patent citation information for 
our sample firms is observed only up to 2006. For this reason, newer patents are more subject to the citation 
truncation issue. See Hall et al. (2001, 2005) for more discussion of this issue and their method used to calculate 
the truncation adjustment factor (HJTWT). 
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I collect stock prices, returns, trading volume, and number of shares outstanding from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly tapes for all common stocks 
(CRSP share code 10 and 11) traded in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Then, I compute a 
firm’s stock price level by averaging monthly closing prices in a year; its share turnover as 
the average of monthly share turnovers; and its price volatility using monthly stock returns 
over previous two years. I also identify firms that split their shares through CRSP event tape. 
Split firms are those that have distribution codes (DISTCD) of 5523 or 5533, have non-
missing split declaration date, and have a split factor (FACSHR) of at least 0.25. 
In my tests on IPO firms I collect IPO price from Thomson Financial SDC database. 
Specifically I collect IPO actual offering price or mid-point filing range from IPO initial 
filings. The IPO price is then merged with patents and Compustat samples based on firm 
CUSIP and IPO year.  
Finally, I use Aghion et al.’s (2013) data for out tests on CEO turnovers.15 According 
to Aghion et al, the CEO turnover data are constructed by Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-
Kropf (2005). The whole data set, along with share price level from my sample, is also used 
as a robustness check for some of my other analyses.  
My final main sample starts from 1980, the first year with available institutional 
ownership data, and ends at 2005, one year before the final year of available patent data. The 
sample includes 58,635 firm-year observations from 8,759 unique firms that have valid 
future patent data.
16
 
                                                          
15
 I thank Aghion et al. (2013) for making their complete dataset and programming codes available online at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.1.277 
16
 Analyses that require lag or variables other than Sales and K/L will be based on smaller samples depending 
on data availability. 
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3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of my firms in the main sample. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 1, the mean and the median stock price of the firms in my sample are 
$21.74 and $16.00, respectively. On average and on the median, institutional investors own 
35% and 33% of the sample firms’ outstanding shares, respectively. As shown in Panel B, a 
firm’s institutional ownership is highly correlated with its stock price level, with an average 
correlation of about 0.47 in annual cross-sectional correlations, which indicates that 
institutions tend to have higher ownership in firms with higher stock prices, consistent with 
Gompers and Metrick’s (2001) findings. This high correlation is the starting point to contend 
that some of institutional ownership’s properties in the governance of firm innovation may 
derive from its correlation with stock price level. 
Indeed, both institutional ownership and stock price level are correlated to firm 
innovation, measured by total annual citations on a firm’s patents. While the average 
correlation between institutional ownership and firm innovation is 0.236, the average 
correlation between natural log of stock price level and firm innovation is higher at 0.321.  
Of course, many factors may contribute to firm innovation. For example, a firm’s 
R&D capital is a significant contributor to innovation, with an average correlation of 0.696 
between the two variables. Firm size, as measured by annual sales, is also a significant factor, 
having an average correlation of 0.344 with innovation. A firm’s capital-to-labor ratio also 
has some effect on its innovation, with an average correlation of 0.119. Furthermore, a firm’s 
innovation should have a positive effect on firm valuation, which may be captured by its 
Tobin’s Q. On average, the correlation between Tobin’s Q and firm innovation is 0.104. In 
the sections that follow, I follow Aghion et al. (2013) to control for these factors in 
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comparing the roles of institutional ownership and stock price level in the governance of 
innovation.     
Table 1: Sample Statistics 
This table shows characteristics of firms included in the sample. Sample includes domestic 
non-financial firms from CRSP/Compustat intersection from 1980-2005. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. All variables except CITES, Price, and IO are trimmed at 1% and 99%; IO is trimmed at 
100%. Firm-year observations with negative book equity value, total assets less than $1m, stock price 
less than $5, or having missing values of Price, Sale, or K/L are excluded. Panel A reports statistics 
for the whole sample; Panel B reports correlation of key (transformed) variables; Panel C reports 
variables mean values for sub-samples based on share price quartiles; and Panel D reports mean 
values for sub-samples based on institutional ownership quartiles. 
 
Panel A: Whole sample 
Variables N Mean S.D Median 
Cites 58635 180.43 1520.99 0 
P 58635 21.74 27.1 16 
IO 58635 0.35 0.24 0.33 
K/L 58635 123.6 340.28 43.48 
SALES 58635 5.27 1.87 5.09 
RDC 42191 118.96 789.87 0.34 
Q 58028 1.99 1.52 1.46 
M/B 57275 2.86 3 1.93 
R9 50641 0.17 0.48 0.09 
R3 56546 0.06 0.25 0.03 
Dividends 58300 0.01 0.02 0 
Age 58628 15.55 15.49 11 
Turnover 56797 0.1 0.11 0.06 
Volatility 48666 0.13 0.06 0.12 
S&P500 58635 0.14 0.35 0 
Panel B: Main Variables Correlation 
 
Ln(1+CITES) Ln(1+Counts) Ln(P) IO Ln(K/L) Ln(Sales) Ln(RDC) 
 Ln(1+CITES)  1.000 
       Ln(1+Counts) 0.943 1.000 
      Ln(P)  0.321 0.354 1.000 
    IO  0.236 0.270 0.471 1.000 
   Ln(K/L) 0.119 0.157 0.169 0.212 1.000 
  Ln(Sales) 0.344 0.413 0.577 0.552 0.156 1.000 
  Ln(RDC) 0.696 0.742 0.293 0.303 0.162 0.324 1.000 
 Q  0.104 0.095 0.206 0.103 0.005 (0.155) 0.175 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Sample statistics by Price Quartiles 
 
Quartile Low Price (2) (3) High Price 
CITES 21.93 47.87 96.03 557.23 
COUNTS 1.49 3.21 5.85 32.45 
P 7.01 12.54 21.19 46.34 
IO 0.20 0.30 0.41 0.51 
K/L 106.25 111.78 128.61 147.90 
SALES 3.97 4.74 5.53 6.83 
RDC 20.81 36.39 55.78 311.64 
Q 1.76 1.82 2.04 2.34 
M/B 2.47 2.53 2.87 3.57 
R9 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.25 
R3 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 
Dividends 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Age 10.49 12.29 15.27 24.19 
Turnover 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Volatility 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 
S&P500 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.39 
     
N 14736 14627 14646 14626 
 
Panel D: Sample statistics by Institutional Ownership Quartiles 
 
 Low IO (2) (3) High IO 
CITES 18.31 100.11 290.24 313.13 
COUNTS 1.03 6.67 16.51 18.71 
P 13.15 17.03 23.79 33.01 
IO 0.09 0.25 0.43 0.65 
K/L 116.12 116.29 129.90 132.10 
SALES 3.83 4.82 5.79 6.63 
RDC 14.34 88.27 179.57 159.70 
Q 2.25 1.93 1.86 1.92 
M/B 3.38 2.71 2.62 2.75 
R9 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.18 
R3 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 
Dividends 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Age 10.28 12.62 17.82 21.47 
Turnover 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 
Volatility 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 
S&P500 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.34 
     
N 14664 14656 14655 14660 
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Panel C of Table 1 reports the mean values of the key variables for each price 
quartile. The cut-offs for each quartile are determined by the cross-sectional distribution of 
stock price in each year. The mean stock prices for the highest price quartile is $46.34, which 
is more than 6 times as high as the mean stock price of $7.01 for the lowest price quartile. On 
average, institutional investors own around 20% of the firms’ outstanding shares in the 
lowest price group; it increases to 30% and 41% for the next two price quartiles, and rises up 
to 51% in the highest price group. This positive correlation is consistent with Dyl and 
Elliott’s (2006) findings. Also consistent with their findings is the positive correlation 
between firm size and stock price level. 
Interestingly, on average, higher-priced firms also have more R&D investments and 
more innovation. For the firms in the lowest price quartile, the average total patents applied 
(and subsequently granted) each year is only 1.49 while the corresponding number in the 
highest price quartile is 32.45. The average citation weighted patents are about 22 and 557 
for the lowest and highest price quartiles, respectively. These statistics provide initial 
evidence consistent with the paper’s hypothesis that innovative firms choose high stock price 
levels to guard against investor short-termism and to foster innovation. 
In Panel D of Table 1 I similarly report the mean values of the key variables for each 
institutional ownership quartile. The cut-offs for each quartile are also determined cross-
sectionally each year. The highest quartile has an average institutional ownership of 65% and 
an average stock price of 33.01. Hence, the firms that institutional investors most prefer have 
an average price of around $33, which is lower than the average price of around $46 for the 
firms in the highest price quartile. This suggests that while institutional ownership tends to 
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increases with stock price level, their preference toward high-priced firms declines when 
their stock price levels exceed some point. 
To further illustrate this point, I extend Gompers and Metrick’s (2001) analysis on 
what may attract institutional ownership. Table 2 presents the results of regressing 
institutional ownership on price, price squared, and a set of control variables, including firm 
size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, dividend, firm age, turnover, volatility and S&P 500 
dummy. The results show that price is significantly positive, but price squared is significantly 
negative. This non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and stock price is 
consistent with the conjecture that institutions seem to change their preference toward high-
priced firms beyond some price level.
17
 This is an important difference between institutional 
ownership and stock price level when I try to differentiate the association of stock price with 
firm innovation from that of institutional ownership later on. 
It is worth mentioning that, as shown in Panels C and D of Table 1, the firms in the 
highest price quartile have an average annual total patent citations of 557, which is higher 
than the average annual total citations of 313 for the firms in the highest institutional 
ownership quartile. This provides a hint that, on average, high-priced firms is more 
innovative than high-IO firms. It is also a preview of what this research attempts to show that 
high stock price level is more relevant to foster innovation than high institutional ownership.     
 
  
                                                          
17
 The turning point of the institutional investors’ preference for high-priced stocks suggested by the regression 
results is around $80.  
25 
 
Table 2: Institutional Ownership and Stock Price 
This table presents coefficients estimates of the following regression: 
IO =0+ 1log(P) + 2 log(P)* log(P) + 3X +  
where P is share price level and X is a matrix of control variables. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Columns (1) and (2) present regression coefficients using Fama-MacBeth technique 
with Newey-West corrected standard error with lag length 2 and include industry fixed effects. 
Columns (3) and (4) present results using OLS regressions with robust firm cluster standard errors 
and a full set of year and industry dummies. Industries are defined as Compustat 3-digit SIC codes. 
Sample is from 1980 to 2005. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FM FM OLS OLS 
Log(P) 0.085
***
 0.240
***
 0.085
***
 0.272
***
 
 (0.004) (0.036) (0.005) (0.018) 
Log(P)^2  -0.026
***
  -0.031
***
 
  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Log(B/M) -0.002 -0.000 0.007
*
 0.009
***
 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Firm Size 0.050
***
 0.049
***
 0.053
***
 0.052
***
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Momentum (-12,-3) -0.023
***
 -0.025
***
 -0.015
***
 -0.017
***
 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Momentum  (-3,0) -0.028
***
 -0.029
***
 -0.017
***
 -0.018
***
 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Div/Me) -0.588
***
 -0.714
***
 -0.424
***
 -0.585
***
 
 (0.206) (0.214) (0.125) (0.124) 
Log(Firm Age) -0.002 -0.001 -0.008
***
 -0.007
**
 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log(Share Turnover) 60.942
***
 59.081
***
 52.001
***
 49.977
***
 
 (5.621) (5.270) (2.238) (2.161) 
Log(Volatility) -0.566
***
 -0.524
***
 -0.516
***
 -0.482
***
 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.039) (0.037) 
S&P500  -0.024 -0.012 -0.025
***
 -0.013
*
 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year FE   Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 44165 44165 44165 44165 
R
2
 0.577 0.584 0.578 0.585 
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CHAPTER 4: MITIGATING INVESTOR SHORT-TERMISM  
Investor short-termism would push managers to excessively focus on quarterly 
earnings performance at the expense of long-term potentials, which would be unfavorable to 
R&D. My hypothesis posits that keeping high stock price levels allows firms to mitigate 
investor short-termism and enhance innovation. This chapter compares the effectiveness of 
stock price (P) and that of institutional ownership (IO) in mitigating investor short-termism. 
Chapter 5 then compares their associations with firm innovation. 
4.1. R&D Policy  
Bushee (1998) examines the role of institutional ownership in managers’ decision to 
reduce R&D spending that could reverse a decline in earnings. He finds that managers are 
less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline in firms with high institutional 
ownership. His finding suggests that institutional investors play an important role in 
mitigating managers’ myopia. 
I re-run Bushee’s (1998) analysis to see whether it is high institutional ownership or 
high price that has an effect of reducing pressure on managers to cut R&D to boost operating 
performance. Following Bushee (1998), I select firms that have a decline in pre-tax, pre-
R&D earnings in the current year but could potentially reverse the earnings decline by 
cutting R&D (i.e., the decline in earnings is less than the R&D expenditure of the previous 
year). To be consistent with Bushee (1998), I include firms with all price levels and exclude 
firms with R&D/Sales of less than 1% and in 3-digit SIC industries with fewer than 3 firms. I 
then estimate the effect of share price level on R&D cutting decision by using the Probit 
regression model: 
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Pr(RDCUTi,t =1) = (β0 + β1log(P)i,t + β2Xi,t + β3Industry_DM + β4Year_DM + t)
            (1) 
where (.) is the cumulative Gaussian distribution, RDCUT is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms that make smaller investments in R&D in the current year 
compared to that of the last year and 0 otherwise, X is the set of control variables as defined 
in Bushee (1998), and subscripts i and t denote firm and time indicators.
 
Table 3 reports the 
Probit regression results.
18
  
Model (1) reports the results based on Bushee’s (1998) sample period from 1983 
through 1994. It shows that, without P, institutional ownership is significantly negative, 
which is consistent with Bushee’s finding that firms with higher IO are less likely to cut 
R&D following poor earnings performance. However, adding P to the Probit regression 
model makes IO insignificant, as shown in model (2). Instead, P is significantly negative, 
suggesting that, following poor earnings, high-priced firms, not those with more IO, are less 
likely to cut R&D.  
Model (3) shows that the results hold for the main sample period from 1980 through 
2005. The results still hold when I restrict the sample firms to have stock price more than $5 
and total assets more than $1 million, as reported in Model (4). Furthermore, since firms’ 
decisions on R&D investments may be affected by industry characteristics or 
macroeconomics conditions (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen 2009), for robustness checks, I 
control for year-fixed effects in model (5) and control for both year-fixed and industry-fixed 
effects in model (6). Both models show that the effect of stock price level remains almost the 
same as in model (3). 
                                                          
18
 The results are almost identical if I use logit regressions. 
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Table 3: R&D Cut to Reverse Earning Declines 
This table reports Probit regression of R&D cutting indicator on a set of independent variables following Bushee (1998). Sample includes firms 
with a change in pre-tax, pre-R&D earnings is negative but larger than previous year’s R&D expenditure. Variable definitions are in Table 1. 
Columns (1) and (2) are based on Bushee’s (1998) original sample period (1983-1994) while the next four columns (3) – (6) on full sample period 
(1980 – 2005). Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Sample period 1983-1994    1980 – 2005   
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
IO -0.398
**
 -0.305  0.090 0.014 -0.060 -0.061 
 (0.201) (0.199)  (0.108) (0.119) (0.113) (0.115) 
log(P)  -0.118
***
  -0.225
***
 -0.114
**
 -0.177
***
 -0.176
***
 
  (0.040)  (0.025) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029) 
PCRD -0.468
***
 -0.442
***
  -0.166
***
 -0.086 -0.155
***
 -0.159
***
 
 (0.090) (0.088)  (0.052) (0.070) (0.053) (0.053) 
CIRD -1.024
***
 -0.981
***
  -0.883
***
 -1.076
***
 -0.823
***
 -0.702
***
 
 (0.269) (0.271)  (0.156) (0.195) (0.169) (0.175) 
Q -0.039
*
 -0.030  -0.024
*
 -0.020 -0.030
**
 -0.023
*
 
 (0.024) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
CCAPX -0.249
***
 -0.244
***
  -0.304
***
 -0.296
***
 -0.299
***
 -0.298
***
 
 (0.037) (0.037)  (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) 
CSALES -0.219
***
 -0.216
***
  -0.143
***
 -0.183
***
 -0.140
***
 -0.152
***
 
 (0.071) (0.063)  (0.037) (0.059) (0.038) (0.038) 
MELOG -0.057
***
 -0.009  0.019 0.010 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.026)  (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
DIST 0.835
***
 0.843
***
  0.028 -0.036 0.020 0.040 
 (0.074) (0.085)  (0.061) (0.075) (0.061) (0.062) 
LEVB 0.233 0.188  -0.041 -0.030 0.012 0.039 
 (0.147) (0.150)  (0.091) (0.121) (0.092) (0.094) 
CFAT -0.245 -0.082  -0.109 -0.042 -0.066 -0.126 
 (0.152) (0.158)  (0.088) (0.125) (0.089) (0.093) 
N 2788 2788  6032 4034 6032 6020 
Conditions     Price >$5, 
AT>$1m 
Year dummies Year &  
Industry  
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In model (3), the coefficient of log(P) is -0.225 (t-value=-9.00). One can use this 
estimated beta of log(P), ˆ
1
, to infer the marginal effect of stock price in reducing the 
probability of cutting R&D.
19
 At the mean values of the other explanatory variables, the 
effect of a price increase from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile leads to a 7.2% 
decline in probability of cutting R&D; and the effect of a price rise from the 50th percentile 
to the 75th percentile level leads to a 6.7% decline in probability of cutting R&D. These 
inferences suggest that the effect of stock price level on the R&D policy is non-trivial. 
In sum, the findings suggest that the R&D policies of firms keeping higher stock 
price levels tend to be less affected by short-term earnings fluctuations. The evidence implies 
that high-priced firms tend to have long-term views on their R&D investments, consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms set high stock price levels to mitigate investor short-termism. 
The evidence also implies that, in the presence of stock price level, institutional ownership 
appears to play an insignificant role in reshaping managerial myopia. 
4.2. Stock Price and CEO Turnovers  
I next re-examine Aghion et al.’s (2013) finding that firms with higher IO are less 
likely to fire their CEOs in the face of profit downturns. For this test I rely on Aghion et al.’s 
(2013) dataset and compliment it with share price level from the sample. Table 4 replicates 
their analyses on the likelihood of forcing CEOs to resign, and then adds P and PxdE, the 
interaction of P and changes in earnings, to the explanatory variables. Consistent with 
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 As an example, I use the regression result from model (3) to calculate the marginal effect, which equals to
ˆ ˆ( )f   , where f is a normal density function and  are a set of mean values of independent variables.  In the 
sample of the R&D cutting test, the log(P) at the 25
th
 percentile is 1.18, at the 50
th
 percentile is 2.01, and at the 
75
th
 percentile is 2.82. 
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Aghion et al.’s (2013) findings, models (1) and (2) report that poor earnings increases the 
likelihood of CEOs being forced out but the likelihood of ousting CEOs because of poor 
earnings is reduced by IOs. Again, this effect from institutional ownership becomes 
insignificant once I add P and PxdE to their model. The evidence suggests that Aghion et 
al.’s (2013) finding that institutional investors are more tolerant to profit downturn and thus 
reduce mangers’ career concerns in pursuing innovation is not robust. Instead, I find that 
even though the interaction term of price and changes in earnings, PxdE, is also insignificant, 
P is significantly negative, which implies that high-priced firms are less likely to force CEOs 
to resign than their low-priced counterparts. 
Thus, while it is understandable that institutional investors have better incentives and 
higher capacity to monitor firm managers, it is questionable what the extant literature has 
shown concerning the effectiveness of IO on mitigating short-termism. The findings that P 
takes away from IO the explanatory power on firms’ R&D policies and on CEO firing imply 
that the function of IO is largely derived from its correlation with P. Therefore, it is important 
to control for stock price levels when addressing the role of institutional ownership in the 
governance of innovation. Furthermore, the result reveals that high stock price levels have an 
important property of guarding against investor short-termism, allowing managers to pursue 
long-term projects. 
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Table 4: IO, Price, and CEO Turnovers 
This table reports marginal effects of Probit regressions of forced CEO exits on firm profits and other 
determinants. Price is fiscal year end price of US Compustat firms. Dependent variable and all other 
independent variables data are from Aghion et al. (2013), downloadable from 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.1.277. All regressions include a full set of 
time dummies and a quadratic in the tenure of the CEO. Refer to Aghion et al. (2013) for full variable 
description. Firm- cluster standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, *** denotes statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(P)  -0.013
**
  -0.013
**
 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Log(P) * Δ(Profits/assets)t−1  0.129  0.173 
  (0.271)  (0.251) 
Δ(Profits/assets)t−1 -1.604
***
 -1.691
**
 -1.274
***
 -1.594
**
 
 (0.496) (0.722) (0.362) (0.689) 
IO × Δ(Profits/assets)t−1 0.025
**
 0.017   
 (0.010) (0.012)   
IO -0.000 -0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000)   
(IO  > 25%) × Δ(Profits/assets)t−1   1.057
**
 0.736 
   (0.456) (0.512) 
IO  > 25%   -0.033 -0.016 
   (0.021) (0.018) 
N 1897 1771 1897 1771 
Years 1988–1995 1988–1995 1988–1995 1988–1995 
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CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, STOCK PRICE, AND 
FIRM INNOVATION  
This chapter formally compares the associations of firm innovation with institutional 
ownership and stock price level. Following Aghion et al. (2013) and the extant literature on 
innovation, I regress firm innovation on institutional ownership (IO), stock price level (P), 
and a set of control variables (X) as follows:  
log(1+CITESi,t+2)
 = α + β1IOi,t + β2log(Pi,t)+ β3Xi,t + Industry + Year + e      (2) 
The subscript t+2 under CITES indicates that I use patent citations two years into the 
future to measure innovation to capture the notion that it may take time for important patents 
to show their impacts.  
For the control variables, I follow Aghion et al. (2013) to control for capital labor 
ratio (K/L), firm size, and R&D stocks. To control for growth opportunities, I include M/B or 
Tobin’s Q. Since innovation might be different in different time periods and in different 
industries, I also include industry dummies as well as year dummies in all tests. 
Furthermore, there are two factors that could lead to a positive association between 
future innovation and current stock price level. One factor is that, according to the 
dissertation’s hypothesis, high stock price level mitigates investor short-termism and 
enhances innovation. And, the other one is that future innovation could be capitalized in 
current firm valuation and stock price is part of firm valuation. I include M/B or Tobin’s Q in 
analysis to capture the valuation effect of innovation, which should allow me to more clearly 
test whether high stock price enhances innovation, as hypothesized in this research. Later, I 
provide several robustness tests to verify this inference. 
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5.1. Basic Results 
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions with robust firm cluster standard errors. 
Consistent with Aghion et al.’s (2013) findings, in model (1), which controls only capital-to-
labor ratio and firm size, institutional ownership is positive and significant. The regression 
coefficient on IO is 0.526 (t-value=5.21), very close to a marginal effect of institutional 
ownership on patents of around 6% with each 10% increase in IO, as reported by Aghion et 
al. (2013). However, in model (2) in which log(P) is added to help explain firm innovation, 
IO’s coefficient declines to 0.12 (t-value=1.11). This result indicates that, in the presence of 
log(P), IO loses its power in explaining firm innovation.
20
 In contrast, log(P) is very 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.396 (t-value=13.65). 
Log(P) remains highly significant and IO insignificant in model (3), where I add 
R&D capital (RDC); in model (4), where I add M/B; and in model (5), where I add Tobin’s 
Q. Given that RDC largely captures innovation inputs and patents are innovation output, it is 
not surprising that the regression coefficient on Log(RDC) is highly significant, ranging from 
5.32 (t-value=26.60) in model (5) to 5.42 (t-value=27.10) in model (3). Further, adding 
Log(RDC) increases the regression R
2
 from around 40% (model (2)) to 55% (models (3)-
(5)). Models (4) and (5) show that innovation is significantly related to M/B and Tobin’s Q, 
respectively. However, including M/B or Tobin’s Q in analysis only slightly change the 
association between innovation and stock price level, suggesting that the association is more 
due to high stock price level fostering innovation and less due to the valuation effect of future 
innovation, as discussed above. 
                                                          
20
 I also re-run the analyses using Aghion et al.’s (2013) data and specifications and obtain virtually the same 
result, i.e., the effects of institutional ownership becomes statistically insignificant when I add into the model 
log(P). Details are presented in Appendix C. 
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Table 5: Share Price, Institutional Ownership and Innovation 
This table presents OLS regressions of future innovation on firm characteristics: 
log(1+CITESi,t+2)
 = α + β1IOi,t + β2log(Pi,t)+ β3Xi,t + Industry + Year + e 
Variables definitions are in the Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry dummies. Industries are Compustat 3-digit SIC codes. 
Sample is from 1980 to 2005. Robust firm cluster standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(P)  0.396
***
 0.253
***
 0.211
***
 0.175
***
 0.017 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) 
IO 0.526
***
 0.120 -0.092 -0.071 -0.079 0.050 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.105) 
Log(K/L) 0.217
***
 0.208
***
 0.083
***
 0.089
***
 0.093
***
 0.094
***
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log(Sales) 0.423
***
 0.367
***
 0.236
***
 0.254
***
 0.269
***
 0.245
***
 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log(RDC)   0.542
***
 0.539
***
 0.532
***
 0.148
***
 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.051) 
M/B    0.027
***
  0.023
***
 
    (0.007)  (0.007) 
Q     0.087
***
  
     (0.016)  
Log(P) * log(RDC)      0.116
***
 
      (0.016) 
N 58635 58635 42191 41434 41991 41434 
R
2
 0.398 0.407 0.551 0.554 0.553 0.559 
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To assess the marginal effect of stock price level on innovation (keeping all other 
variables constant), I use Log(P)’s estimated coefficient of 0.175 (t-value=5.47) in model (5), 
which suggests that future innovation is 14% higher for an average firm in the second price 
quartile, compared to an average firm in the lowest price quartile;
21
 or 21% higher for an 
average firm in the highest price quartile, compared to that in the third price quartile. Thus, 
the effect of stock price level on firm innovation is large and economically meaningful. 
To further show the channel through which stock price level affects innovation, I 
include Log(P)*Log(RDC), the interaction of stock price and R&D capital, in analysis. As 
shown in Model (6), the coefficient of the interaction is 0.116 (t-value=7.25), which is highly 
significant, while Log(P) becomes insignificant and its coefficient changes from 0.211 (t-
value=6.81) in model (4) to 0.017 (t-value=0.50) in model (6). The coefficient of Log(RDC) 
also changes from 0.539 (t-value=26.95) in model (4) to 0.148 (t-value=2.90) in model (6). 
Taken together, the findings suggest that a large part of R&D productivity, i.e., the relation 
between innovation and R&D capital, is associated with stock price level, and that the 
channel through which high stock price level enhances innovation is to improve the R&D 
productivity. In other words, firms that set a higher stock price level to mitigate investor 
short-termism tend to have higher R&D productivity. Nevertheless, if they invest little in 
R&D, firms would not benefit much in innovation from setting a high stock price level. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis  
To see how sensitive the results are, I conduct the following sensitivity analyses. 
First, I use future citations measured at t+1, t+2, and t+3, i.e., from one year to three years 
                                                          
21
 This marginal effect is obtained by the coefficient estimate multiplied by the difference in the log mean price 
values of the two price quartiles, as shown in Panel C of Table 1. 
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into the future, in analysis. This is to make sure the test results are not sensitive to the way I 
measure future innovation at t+2. Next, in addition to the variables used by Aghion et al.’s 
(2013) to explain future innovation, I add to the regression model Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ 
(in logarithm), which measures stock illiquidity. Fang, Tian, and Tice (2013) argue that stock 
liquidity impedes innovation because stock liquidity encourages trading and puts pressure on 
managers. Third, I further extend the regression model to include firm fixed effects. This 
allows me to address the issues associated with possible omitted time-invariant variables. 
Table 6 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis. Several things are worth 
mentioning. First, the regression 2R ’s are all around 80%, which are much higher than those 
around 55% reported in Table 5. Most of the increases in 2R  are due to the firm-fixed 
effects. This suggests that a large part of firm innovation is time-invariant. In other words, 
innovative (non-innovative) firms tend to remain innovative (non-innovative) for many years 
to come.  
Second, IO is significantly negative in the t+1 regression and insignificant in the t+2 
and t+3 regressions. The findings are inconsistent with Aghion et al.’s (2013) argument that 
institutional ownership enhances firm innovation.
22
 Similarly, Log(ILLIQ) is significantly 
negative in the t+1 regression, insignificant in the t+2 regression, and marginally positive in 
the t+3 regression. The results suggest that Fang, Tian, and Tice’s (2013) finding that stock 
liquidity impedes innovation is not robust.  
 
                                                          
22
 As noted in the footnote 20, I re-run the analyses using Aghion et al.’s (2013) posted data sample and model 
specifications. Aghion et al. (2013) rely on a sample of firms from 1991-1999 with innovation measures 
computed from the 2002 version of the patent database from NBER. They also use Poisson models as their 
main tests. In all these sensitivity analyses, I obtain virtually the same result, i.e., the effects of institutional 
ownership becomes statistically insignificant when I add to the models the log of stock price level. Furthermore, 
the effects from stock price level are, in all cases, statistically and economically significant. 
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Table 6: Share Price, IO, RDC, and Innovation 
This table reports regression estimates from the following regression: 
log(1+CITESi,t+j)
 = α + β1IOi,t + β2 log(Pi,t)+ β3 log(RDC) + β4 log(P)*log(RDC) +  
β5Xi,t + FirmDummy + YearDummy + e 
 
where P is the Compustat PRCC_F and j denotes the number of years into the future to measure 
innovation (CITES). X presents a full set of log(SALES), log(K/L), M/B, and natural log of 
Amihud’s ILLIQ. Variables definitions are in Appendix A. Sample includes non-financial US firms 
from 1980-2005. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 j=1 j=2 j=3 
Log(P) 0.035 0.063
**
 0.073
**
 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) 
IO -0.221
**
 -0.003 0.048 
 (0.107) (0.112) (0.122) 
Log(K/L) 0.058
*
 0.052 0.039 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.038) 
Log(Sales) 0.146
***
 0.160
***
 0.184
***
 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.037) 
Log(RDC) -0.059 -0.205
***
 -0.371
***
 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.060) 
M/B -0.010 -0.014
**
 -0.023
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(P)*Log(RDC) 0.026
**
 0.037
***
 0.053
***
 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
Log(ILLIQ) -0.030
**
 -0.000 0.026
*
 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 39684 37394 35187 
R
2
 0.828 0.812 0.797 
 
 
Third, the interaction term of Log(P) and log(RDC) is significantly positive for all 
three regressions, consistent with the earlier finding that the productivity of R&D 
investments increases with the stock price level. Thus, my earlier inference that high stock 
price levels foster innovation is robust. 
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5.3. Portfolio Analysis 
To illustrate how the interaction term of Log(P) and log(RDC) works, I use the 
portfolios of firms sorted independently by RDC and P. Specifically, each year I sort all 
firms into four stock price quartiles. Firms are also grouped into a zero-RDC portfolio (if 
they have no investment in R&D or do not report R&D in the current year and the previous 4 
years) and four positive-RDC portfolios (based on RDC quartile cut-offs for firms with 
positive RDC). The double sorting results in 20 portfolios. Panel A of Table 7 reports the 
average annual patent citations for each of the 20 portfolio. Across each price level, firms 
with higher RDC tend to have more patent citations; and the increase of patent citations with 
RDC is especially strong for firms having high P. For example, for the lowest P quartile 
portfolios, the average annual patent citations increase from 8.1 for low-RDC firms to 294.2 
for high-RDC firms, an increase of about 36 times. As for the highest P quartile portfolios, 
the citations increase from 13.1 for low-RDC firms to 1921.1 for high-RDC firms, an 
increase of about 147 times! The pattern clearly illustrates that while more R&D investments 
lead to more patent citations, the productivity of R&D investments is much larger for firms 
setting higher stock price levels. 
Table 7: Citations and RDC 
Each year stocks are sorted independently based on Price and RDC quartiles. Firms with no RDC are 
grouped separately. Panel A shows the average citations-weighted number of patents for each group 
while Panel B shows number of firms assigned to the group.  
Panel A: Number of citations-weighted patents  
 
RDC=0 Low RDC 2 3 High RDC 
Low Price          1.6           8.1   21.0       55.2        294.2  
2          2.5         12.6   31.6       95.2        481.7  
3          7.0         13.3   42.4     111.2        752.2  
High Price        44.8         13.1   45.6    145.3     1,921.1  
High – Low      43.2         5 24.6        90.1 1,626.9 
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Panel B: Number of observations  
 RDC=0 Low RDC 2 3 High RDC 
Low Price 4466 2311 1535 732 229 
2 4893 1670 1608 1184 454 
3 5462 1004 1389 1738 1087 
High Price 5525 486 927 1810 3681 
 
Table 7 also reports the number of observations in each portfolio. If setting higher 
stock price levels is beneficial to foster innovation, we should expect that high-RDC firms 
would prefer to choose to keep their stock prices at higher levels. Indeed, we see that, of the 
5,451 firm-year observations in the high-RDC quartile, 3,681 (67.5%) belong to the top-P 
quartiles and only 229 (4.2%) belong to the bottom-P quartile. Conversely, of the 5471 firm-
year observations in the low-RDC quartile, only 486 (8.9%) are in the top-P quartile while 
2311 (42.2%) are in the bottom-P quartile. The numbers suggest that the distributions of 
firm-year observations across the price quartiles for high-RDC firms and for low-RDC firms 
are very different. The distributions are consistent with the hypothesis that keeping high 
stock price levels allows innovative firms to limit speculators’ influences on their price 
volatility and thus to mitigate investor short-termism and foster innovation.
23
  
The finding of clear differences between high-RDC firms’ and low-RDC firms’ 
distribution of firm-year observations across the price quartiles leads to the conjecture that 
R&D investments could be an important determinant of its stock price level. To test this 
conjecture, I extend Dyl and Elliott’s (2006) analysis to see whether RDC has any 
                                                          
23
 Different from firms with positive RDC, firms in the non-RDC group (RDC=0) are relatively evenly 
distributed across share price quartiles.  
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explanatory power on the variation of stock price levels beyond the proxies for investor 
recognition they identify. 
Indeed, Table 8 shows that, in addition to EPS, firm size measured by log book 
equity, and log average investor holding, log RDC is also a very significant determinant of 
stock price level. The evidence implies that fostering innovation is a motive for high-RDC 
firms to keep their stock prices at high levels. In the next section, I use Probit analysis to see 
whether innovative firms are less likely to conduct stock splits to lower their stock price 
levels, which provides a robustness test on whether innovative firms indeed prefer to keep 
high stock price levels. 
Table 8: Share Price and Firm Characteristics 
This table reports the averages of the yearly cross-sectional parameter estimates from the following 
regressions: 
Log(P) = α + β1log(Book Equity) + β2log(AveHolding) + β3EPS + β4Log(RDC) + e 
Columns (1)-(3) use sample from 1976-2001 for firms with continuous trading price data as defined 
in Dyl and Elliott (2006) and columns (4)-(5) use sample of US non-financial firms from 1980-2005 
as defined in the current research. Variables definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Dyl & Elliott sample 
 
  Current 
sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
EPS  0.095
***
 0.081***  0.114
***
 0.122
***
 
     (0.007)     (0.007)  (0.007) (0.005) 
Log(Book Equity)  0.168
***
 0.135***  0.214
***
 0.199
***
 
     (0.009)     (0.012)  (0.008)   (0.005) 
Log(AveHolding)  0.157
***
 0.204***  0.050
***
 0.068
***
 
     (0.013)      (0.020)  (0.006)   (0.008) 
Log(RDC) 0.209
***
 
 
0.049***   0.026
***
 
   (0.006)        (0.007)     (0.005) 
Intercept 2.450
***
 1.418
***
 1.346***  1.520
***
 1.475
***
 
  (0.039)    (0.030)  (0.052)   (0.028)   (0.028) 
 Number of years 25 26 25  24 24 
 Average R
2
 0.40 0.61 0.69  0.55 0.58 
 Average ob. Per year 330 755 320  2688 1830 
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CHAPTER 6: REVERSE CAUSALITY 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, it is possible that investors may bid up a firm’s 
stock price when they anticipate more future innovation by the firm. In this case, it is 
innovation causing high stock price, rather than high stock price enhancing innovation. But, 
the firm can decide to keep its high stock price level or to split its shares to lower its stock 
price level. In fact, many firms split their stocks to manage their stock price levels (Weld et 
al 2009, Dyl and Elliott 2006, among others). Thus, I conduct two additional robustness tests. 
The first one is on a sample of stock splits in which managers re-set the stock price levels, 
and the second test on a sample of IPOs in which the offering price range is also set by 
managers. Thus, these two robustness checks would allow me to see whether managers of 
innovative firms actively set their stock price levels to mitigate investor short-termism and 
foster innovation. 
6.1. Stock Splits and Firm Innovation 
If it is more innovation causing higher stock price, innovation should not change 
following stock splits. Conversely, if it is higher stock price that fosters innovation, we 
expect innovation to decline following stock splits, because stock splits automatically lower 
stock price levels and lead to more speculative trading by retail investors, as Brandt et al. 
(2010) show. Since my hypothesis emphasizes that innovative firms would keep their stock 
prices at higher levels to guard against investor short-termism, stock splits would weaken this 
function. 
Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) observe that split firms tend to experience 
considerable earnings growth prior to stock splits, and argue that stock splits are used to 
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convey that the recent earnings growth is permanent. McNichols and Dravid (1990) further 
show that firms conduct splits to signal improvements in earnings. It is possible that split 
firms no longer need to keep high stock price levels to guard against investor short-termism; 
instead, it could enhance their firm values by using stock splits to attract more speculative 
traders to look at their improvements in earnings. This reasoning is in line with my 
hypothesis, and suggests that firms actively manage their stock price levels according to their 
needs—i.e., when they invest more in R&D and pursue innovation, they tend to keep high 
stock price levels; conversely, they use stock splits to lower their stock price levels when 
they want to emphasize their earnings. Thus, based on my hypothesis, I predict that (i) 
innovative firms are less likely to engage in stock splits, and (ii) if they do, innovation would 
decline following stock splits. 
To test these predictions, I analyze a sample of 6,088 firms that split their stocks. I 
identify this sample by first collecting firms in the CRSP database that split their shares 
(CRSP distribution code DISTCD = 5523 or 5533) during the sample period. Each stock split 
event is then matched with the annual innovation data.  For firms that have multiple splits in 
a year, I aggregate the split factors (FACSHR) to get a cumulative split factor for the whole 
year. To focus on stock splits that have large effects on stock price levels, I exclude firms 
with the yearly cumulative split factor of less than 0.25 from the sample. I use the split factor 
to measure the relative change in stock price levels induced by stock splits. Since more than 
half of the splitting firms do not have any patent citations around the split year, Table 9 
reports summary statistics for the whole split sample and for the subsample of split firms 
with positive patent citations. The table report statistics before firms conduct splits as well as 
for the changes of the key variables following stock splits. 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Splitting Firms 
This table report summary statistics for a sample of firms that split stocks. The whole split sample 
includes domestic, non-financial firms from the 1980-2005 period that split shares with split factors 
from 0.25 to 3.5; and the Innovative split sample is the whole split sample excluding firms with no 
patent citations the year before and after stock splits Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 
Whole Split Sample  Innovative Split sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
        FACSHR 6088 0.816  0.459  
 
1775 0.879  0.454  
Log(1+CITES)t-1 5420 1.544  2.439  
    IOR t-1 5420  0.363  0.246  
    Log(SALES) t-1 5420 5.414  1.869  
    Log(M/B) t-1 5390  1.035  0.763  
    Return12 t-1 5002  0.705  1.106  
    Log(P) t-1 5420  3.314  0.664  
    Sales growth t-1 4461 0.206  0.262  
    
        Δlog(1+Cites)t+2, t-1 6088  -0.017 1.300  
 
1775 -0.057 2.088  
Δ IOt, t-1 5420 0.041  0.107  
 
1775 0.024  0.092  
Δ Log(K/L) t, t-1 5420   0.088  0.262  
 
1775 0.071  0.167  
Δ Log(Sales) t, t-1 5420 0.296  0.337  
 
1775 0.220  0.269  
Δ Log(RDC)t, t-1 3968 0.077  0.205  
 
1775 0.128  0.243  
 
Table 9 reports that, on average, innovation declines slightly following stock splits. 
However, there is a significant increase in institutional ownership. IO increases by 4.1% and 
2.4% from the beginning value to the ending value of the split year in the whole split sample 
and innovative split sample, respectively. 
To further examine the characteristics of firms that split shares, I run a probit 
regression to see what firm characteristics may affect the split decision. Specifically, I 
estimate the following regression: 
Prob(SPLIT=1)t = (β0 + β1Log(Innovation)t-1 + β2IO t-1+β3X +  
Industry_DM + Year_DM + t)        (3) 
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where, as before, (
.
) is a cumulative Gaussian distribution function, subscript t indicates the 
year during which firm split their shares, SPLIT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for splitting firms and 0 otherwise, Innovation is either RDC or CITES, and X is a matrix of 
factors that potentially affect split decisions. The matrix X includes Sales, M/B, cumulative 
returns in the last 12 months, Price level, and Sales growth, as suggested by Chemmanur, Hu, 
and Huang (2014). I provide the definition of these variables in Appendix A.  
Panel A of Table 10 reports the probit regression results. The results show that the 
coefficients on both log(RDC) and log(1+CITES) are significantly negative in all settings, 
implying that innovative firms are less likely to split their share. The coefficient on IO is also 
negative, suggesting that firms with high IO are also less likely to do stock splits. The 
evidence is consistent with Dyl and Elliott (2006), who show that firms that can attract more 
institutional investors tend to keep higher stock price levels. This finding, along with the 
increase in institutional ownership after stock split presented in Table 9, suggests that some 
institutional investors are attracted by splitting firms and increase their holdings in these 
firms. Also, the results from Table 10 are consistent with Lakonishok and Lev (1987) and 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) that firms having higher stock prices, higher past stock 
returns, higher M/B ratio, and higher sales growth, are more likely to split their shares.  
To access the changes of innovation output in the years subsequent to stock splits, I 
estimate the following regression: 
Δlog(1+Cites)t+2, t-1 = β0 + β1FACSHR + β2ΔIOt, t-1 + β3Δlog(K/L)t, t-1 + β4Δsizet, t-1 + 
β5Δlog(RDC)t,t-1 + Industry FE + Time FE    (4) 
where the dependent variable is the change in innovation output 2 years after split compared 
to before split and the independent variables include the split factor, changes in IO, K/L, firm 
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size, and R&D stock before and after the splits. The sample is restricted to firms that split 
their shares with annual FACSHR greater than or equal to 0.25. I conduct the test on the 
whole split sample that includes all splitting firms and on the subsample that only includes 
split firms with positive patent citations the year before or after split. 
Table 10: Stock Split and Innovation 
Panel A: Stock Split Determinants 
This table present Probit regressions of stock split dummy on other independent variables measured at 
the beginning of the year of the stock split: 
Prob(SPLIT=1)t = (β0 + β1Log(Innovation)t-1 + β2IO t-1+β3X +  
Industry_DM + Year_DM + t)         
 
where Innovation is either RDC or CITES. Variables definitions are in Appendix A. Industries are 
Compustat 3-digit SIC codes. Sample includes firms in the intersection of splitting firms with annual 
cumulative split factor of at least 0.25 and the main sample specified in Table 1. Sample is from 1980 
to 2005 (citations measured up to 2006). Robust firm cluster standard errors are reported in 
parentheses; *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Log(RDC)t-1  -0.048
***
 -0.025
***
   
  (0.006) (0.010)   
Log(1+CITES)t-1    -0.033
***
 -0.016
***
 
    (0.005) (0.006) 
IOt-1 -0.287
***
 -0.242
***
 -0.365
***
 -0.265
***
 -0.368
***
 
 (0.068) (0.077) (0.082) (0.068) (0.073) 
Log(SALES) t-1 -0.095
***
 -0.087
***
 -0.141
***
 -0.084
***
 -0.135
***
 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) 
Log(M/B) t-1 0.123
***
 0.167
***
 0.122
***
 0.138
***
 0.105
***
 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) 
Return12 t-1 0.278
***
 0.306
***
 0.253
***
 0.272
***
 0.224
***
 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
Log(P) t-1 0.736
***
 0.735
***
 0.944
***
 0.753
***
 0.944
***
 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.041) (0.045) 
Sales growth t-1 0.165
***
 0.264
***
 0.239
***
 0.158
***
 0.132
***
 
 (0.027) (0.040) (0.041) (0.028) (0.030) 
Industry Dummies No No Yes No Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 36820 29806 29508 36820 36623 
R
2
 16.11 16.18 19.36 16.37 19.41 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
 
Panel B: Stock Split and Change in Innovations 
This table reports regression coefficients of changes in future cite-weighted patents on firm 
characteristics and stock split factor: 
Δlog(1+Cites)t+2, t-1 = β0 + β1FACSHR + β2ΔIOt, t-1 + β3Δlog(K/L)t, t-1 + β4Δsizet, t-1 + 
β5Δlog(RDC)t,t-1 + Industry FE + Time FE  
Dependent variable is the change in Innovations two years after splits and before stock splits, 
measured as log(1+Cites)t+2 – log(1+Cites)t-1. Independent variables include change from before and 
after splits in institutional ownership (ΔIO), change in capital labor ratio (Δlog(K/L) ), change in 
firm sale (ΔSize), and change in R&D stock (ΔRDC), and Split factor (FACSHR from CRSP). The 
split factor is set to 0 in years with no stock splits. Whole split sample for regressions in the columns 
(1)-(3) includes domestic, non-financial firms from 1980-2003 that split shares with split factors from 
0.25 to 3; and Innovative sample for the last two columns (4)-(5) is the whole split sample excluding 
firms with no patent citations the year before and after stock splits.  Industries are defined as 
Compustat 3-digit SIC codes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *, **, *** denotes 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Sample  Whole split sample  Innovative split sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
ΔIO 0.453
*
 0.406 0.351  0.476 0.248 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.261)  (0.532) (0.575) 
Δlog(K/L) -0.017 -0.015 0.001  -0.117 -0.010 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.095)  (0.376) (0.403) 
ΔSize -0.022 0.002 -0.009  0.208 0.245 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.106)  (0.208) (0.218) 
Δlog(RDC) 0.081 0.095 0.108  0.168 0.089 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.159)  (0.234) (0.255) 
Split factor  -0.135
***
 -0.139
**
  -0.217
**
 -0.252
**
 
  (0.050) (0.055)  (0.101) (0.114) 
Industry FE No No Yes  No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 3968 3968 3968  1775 1775 
R
2
 0.054 0.056 0.102  0.152 0.246 
 
Regression results, reported in Panel B of Table 10, show that, among splitting firms, 
innovation declines more for firms that choose a larger split factor (the coefficient on 
FACSHR is significantly negative) while IO virtually has no effect.
24
 The evidence is thus 
                                                          
24
 Since changes in innovation around stock splits might be irrelevant for non-innovative firms (i.e. firms 
without any patent citations), model (3) works better in the sample of innovative splitting firms (columns 4 and 
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consistent with my hypothesis that higher P enhances innovation, but inconsistent with the 
notion that the positive association between innovation and P is due to more innovation 
causing higher stock price. 
6.2. IPO Offering Price and Firm Innovation 
I do the second robustness test on the association between stock price level and 
innovation by focusing on a sample of IPO firms identified from the Thomson Financial SDC 
New Issues database. I use the mid-point of the lowest and highest initial filing price as the 
IPO price. The filing price range is of the managers’ choice and is not affected by the 
feedback from the financial markets after firms announce their IPOs. In addition, I also 
repeat my tests with the actual IPO offering price. After merging the IPO data with my main 
sample (including firms with PRCC_F of less than $5 since I are relying on IPO price), I am 
left with 4,716 IPO firms with valid data on IPO offering Prices. Finally, the subsample 
consisting of firms with valid IPO filing prices has 3550 observations. Table 11 reports 
summary statistics of the key variables for the IPO sample. 
On average, institutional investors own 19% (median 15%) shares of IPO firms, 
consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2004)). 
Similarly, the average filing price is $10.6 and the average offering price is $11.8. Also, more 
than half of IPO firms in the sample did not report R&D expenditures when they went for 
IPO.
25
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5) which yields higher R2 values. Also, the magnitude of the split factor coefficient estimates is larger in this 
sample. 
25
 I use R&D of the IPO year instead of R&D capital from previous 5 years due to data limitation on IPO firms 
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Table 11: IPO Sample Characteristics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of a sample of IPO firms. Offer Price is the IPO offering price; 
Middle Price is the average of the low and high IPO filing prices; R&D is R&D expenditure. Other 
variables are described in Table 1. Sample includes IPO firms from SDC New Offering database that 
are merged with domestic, non-financial firms from CRSP/Compustat intersection database from 
1980 – 2003. Firms with missing values of IOR, K/L, Sales, or Offering Price are excluded.  
 
Variables n Mean S.D. Median 
CITES 4716 35.47 437.7 0 
Offer Price 4716 11.08 5.44 11 
Mid-point Filing Price 3550 10.58 4.93 11 
IO 4716 0.19 0.18 0.15 
Log(K/L) 4716 3.34 1.2 3.26 
Log(Sales) 4716 3.3 2 3.53 
Log(1+R&D) 4716 0.73 1.02 0 
 
Table 12: IPO Price and Innovation  
This table reports OLS regression estimates of future innovation on IPO firms’ characteristics: 
log(1+CITESi,t+2)
 = α + β1IOi,t + β2log(Pi,t)+ β3Xi,t + Industry + Year + e 
where P is either IPO mid-point filing price or IPO actual offering price. Variables definitions are in 
Appendix A. Year and industry dummies are included in all regressions. Firm cluster standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
IO 0.406
**
  0.231  0.259 
 (0.183)  (0.227)  (0.187) 
Log(Filing Price)  0.268
***
 0.246
***
   
  (0.078) (0.081)   
Log(Offer Price)    0.280
***
 0.257
***
 
    (0.066) (0.068) 
Log(K/L) 0.079
***
 0.064
**
 0.062
**
 0.069
***
 0.067
***
 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) 
Log(Sales) -0.019 -0.068
***
 -0.073
***
 -0.050
**
 -0.056
***
 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) 
Log(1+R&D) 0.757
***
 0.865
***
 0.864
***
 0.738
***
 0.737
***
 
 (0.046) (0.062) (0.063) (0.046) (0.046) 
N 3702 2812 2812 3702 3702 
R
2
 0.364 0.385 0.385 0.366 0.367 
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Table 12 reports regression model (1) for IPO firms on IPO filing price. It shows that 
firms that set a higher midpoint of IPO offering price range tend to have more future 
innovation. The results are almost the same when I use the final IPO offering price as P. 
Since future innovation is significantly related to the midpoint of the offering price range or 
the final offering price, the evidence is again consistent with the hypothesis that innovative 
firms set high stock price levels to mitigate short-termism and enhance innovation. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This essay compares the roles of institutional ownership and stock price levels in the 
governance of firm innovation. Based on the notion that, by keeping high stock price levels, 
firms can reduce speculative trading by retail investors and reduce price volatility, I 
hypothesize that high prices allow firms to mitigate short-termism and enhance innovation.  
Indeed, I find that high-priced firms are less likely to cut R&D to reverse poor 
earnings performance, and that, unlike Bushee’s (1998) finding, IO shows no effect on the 
R&D policy in the presence of P. I also find that, unlike Aghion et al.’s (2013) finding, IO 
has no effect on CEO firing and on firm innovation in the presence of P; rather, it is high-
priced firms that are less likely to oust their CEOs and are more innovative. These findings 
cast doubt on the claim that institutional investors play a positive role in the governance of 
innovation because of their monitoring and long-term views. Instead, the functions of IO 
found in the extant literature in the governance of innovation are largely derived from IO’s 
correlation with P. 
I further use two robustness checks to verify my findings. In the first check, I 
discover that firm innovation declines after stock splits. In the second check, I reveal that 
IPO firms with a higher offering price range are more innovative. The results in these two 
cases suggest that managers of innovative firms actively support high stock price levels to 
facilitate innovation, rather than being “forced” or “assured” by institutional investors in 
order to pursue innovation. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
All variables, unless otherwise noted, are calculated at fiscal yearend, denoted as year t. Missing 
values for Institutional ownership IO, R&D expenditures XRD, or CITES are set to zero.  
Variable Definition Data Source 
Common variables   
Innovation (CITES) Number of truncation-adjusted patents 
(that are granted) weighted by future 
citations measured at patent application 
year.  
                             
   
 
NBER 2006 
COUNTS Number of patents (that are granted) 
measured at patent application year 
NBER 2006 
Price level (P) PRCC_F, or 
Average trading price during the 
previous 12 months 
Compustat 
CRSP monthly 
Institutional Ownership (IO) IO, aggregate share holding of all 
institutions scaled by total shares 
outstanding at the end of the quarter 
closest to fiscal yearend month 
Spectrum 13f 
Capital-Labor (K/L) PPENT/EMP Compustat 
Firm size (SALES) SALES Compustat 
R&D Stock (RDC) R&Dt + 0.8*R&Dt-1 + 0.6*R&Dt-2 + 
0.4*R&Dt-3 + 0.2 * R&Dt-4 
Compustat 
Market-to-Book (M/B) ME/BE where 
ME = CSHO * PRCC_F 
BE = Stock Equity (SEQ, CEQ+PSTK, 
AT-LT, or 0 depending on availability) 
+ Deferred Taxes (TXDITC) - Preferred 
Equity (PSTKRV, PSTKL, PSTK, or 0 
depending on availability) 
Compustat 
Tobin’s Q  (ME + AT - CEQ - TXDB) / AT Compustat 
Illiquidity (ILLIQ) Amihud’s ILLIQ, the average over year CRSP 
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Variable Definition Data Source 
of 1000000*abs(Return) / 
(abs(Price)*Volume) 
 
IO Determinants 
  
9-month Stock Return (R9) Cumulative monthly stock return from 
month -12 to month -3 relative to fiscal 
year ending month. 
CRSP 
3-month Stock Return (R3) Cumulative monthly stock return from 
month -3 to month 0 relative to fiscal 
year ending month. 
CRSP 
Dividends (DIV) DVC / ME Compustat 
Firm Age (AGE) Number of years the firm has valid stock 
price on CRSP 
CRSP 
Turnover (TO) annual average of monthly share 
turnover 
CRSP 
Volatility (VOL) standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over last two years 
CRSP 
S&P500 membership (SP500) 1 if SPMIM=10, 
0 otherwise 
Compustat 
Capital Expenditure (CAPX) CAPX / AT Compustat 
R&D expense (RDAT) XRD / AT Compustat 
Tangibility (TANG) PPENT / AT Compustat 
R&D cut determinants   
Indicator for R&D cut (CUTRD) 1 if (XRDt –XRDt-1) < 0, 
0 otherwise 
Compustat 
Prior change in R&D (PCRD) ln(XRDt-1) – ln(XRDt-2)  
Change in industry R&D (CIRD) ln(IRDt / ISALESt) - ln(IRDt-1 / 
ISALESt-1) 
 
Change in Capital Expenditure 
(CCAPX) 
ln(CAPXt) – ln(CAPXt-1)  
Change in Sales (CSALES) ln(SALESt) – ln(SALESt-1)  
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Variable Definition Data Source 
Distance from earnings goal 
(DIST) 
(EARNINGt+XRDt)- (EARNINGt-
1+XRDt-1)) / XRDt-1 where 
EARNING = IBCOM + TXDI + ITCI + 
TIE 
 
FCF before R&D (FCF) (OIBDPt + XRDt) / ATt-1  
CEO turnover variables  Aghion et al.  
CEO Exit  1 if forced CEO exit, 0 otherwise  
Share Price determinants   
Average Holding (AveHolding) BE / CSHR Compustat 
Earnings per Share (EPS) EPS Compustat 
Stock Split determinants   
Split dummy 1 if a firm splits share during the year 
with split factor of at least 0.25, 
0 otherwise 
CRSP 
Split factor (FACSHR) (1+FACSHR)-1 for each fiscal year CRSP 
Change in Institutional 
Ownership (ΔIO) 
IOt – IOt-1 Spectrum 13f 
Change in capital labor ratio 
(Δlog(K/L) 
ln(K/Lt) – ln(K/Lt-1) Compustat 
Change in firm sale (ΔSize) ln(SALESt) – ln(SALESt-1) Compustat 
Change in R&D stock (ΔRDC) ln(RDCt) – ln(RDCt-1) Compustat 
IPO variables   
Offering Price (P_OFFER) Official IPO offering price SDC 
Filing Price (P_FILE) MFILE: Mid-point of the price range 
(high and low) in IPO initial filing at 
which firms expect to offer their shares 
SDC 
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APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS TESTS ON AGHION, VAN REENEN, AND 
ZINGALES’S (2013) SAMPLE  
Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (AVZ, 2013) report significant positive effects of 
institutional ownership on firm innovation. They make available online their complete datasets 
and programming codes used to generate their empirical results. Their main sample includes 
firm-year observations from 1991-1999. The citations-weighted patents are calculated based on 
NBER patent database updated to 2002.I utilize these datasets and codes to robustly test the 
hypothesis that it is high price levels set by managers, rather than institutional investors, that 
foster firm innovation.  
First, I reproduce regressions tables reported in their paper. I then merge this sample with a 
sample of US firms (fic=”USA”) with non-missing trading price level PRCC_F taken from 
Compustat. In the merged dataset, I lost around 2.5% of the total observations due to missing 
price. Alternatively, I merge the AVZ sample with average trading prices in the previous 12 
months obtained from CRSP for firms with share codes of 10 or 11. I repeat all the tests in AVZ 
with an added independent variables log(Price). I report these robustness tests in Tables B1 
through B3 with Price taken from Compustat PRCC_F. The results with average price from 
CRSP are qualitatively the same and so skipped. 
 
1. Main empirical results (AVZ Table 1) 
Table B1 replicates Table 1 in AVZ (2013), column by column, and shows that in all regressions 
P has significant and positive effect on innovation. The magnitude of the effect of P is 
qualitatively the same compared to the estimates from my own sample reported in Table 5. In 
contrast, the effects of IO disappears in the presence of P in 7 out of 8 models. IO is marginally 
significant in model (8) with Negative Binomial regression. The evidence from this Table 
supports my hypothesis. 
 
2. Testing the implications of the Career Concerns Hypothesis with the Lazy Manager 
Hypothesis (AVZ Table 2) 
AVZ (2013) contrast the Career Concerns Hypothesis with the Lazy Manager Hypothesis and 
provide tests that support the Career concerns hypothesis. Specifically, the two hypotheses would 
bring different consequences in different firm settings. First, with different product market 
competition levels the two hypotheses predict differently the effect of IO on innovation: The 
Career Concern Hypothesis predicts a complement effect of product market competition and IO 
on innovation while the Lazy Manager Hypothesis predict the two a substitution effect. AVZ 
provide evidence that IO has stronger effect on innovation in more competitive markets, 
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consistent with the prediction of the Career Concern Hypothesis. I add share price as a potential 
governance factor into their original regression models and report results in Table B2. 
Table B2 shows that even in more competitive industries, IO loses its effect on innovation in the 
presence of P. 
The next test that I rerun is the test on CEO turnover. I present this test in the main body of this 
paper. Overall, in the presence of P, IO does not show its effect of reducing the likelihood of 
CEO firings in the face of profit downturns. 
 
 
3. Selection issues (AVZ Table 5) 
 
AVZ discuss in details the selection issues. The reasons is that institutional investors may select 
firms with high innovation to invest in, rather than providing incentives for managers to invest in 
innovation. One of the tools they use to tackle the selection issue is utilizing the inclusion to the 
S&P500 index as an instrumental variable for IO. The addition to the index is likely to attract 
more IO but is unlikely to directly affect firm innovation. After dealing with endogeneity with 
instrumental variables, the effects from IO on innovation reported by AVZ 2013 remain 
significant with a much larger magnitude.  
I repeat these tests and report updated results in Table B3. The results from Table B3 shows that 
even though instrumental variable helps IO avoid being biased downward, the inclusion of P into 
the regressions still takes away all the effects on IO.  
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Table B1: Institutional Ownership and Innovation (AVZ Table 1) 
This table reproduces AVZ Table 1 (columns “Original”) along with share price P as an additional control variable (columns “New”). P is share 
price, PRCC_F, taken from Compustat for US firms. 
AVZ Caption: Firms in all columns: 803. CITES is a count of a firm’s patents weighted by the number of future citations. Coefficients above 
standard errors clustered by firm (in parentheses). All regressions control for a full set of four-digit industry dummies and time dummies. 
Estimation period is 1991–1999 (citations up to 2002); fixed effects controls using the Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999) presample mean 
scaling estimator. 
 
AVZ column 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4  
Model OLS  OLS  Poisson  Poisson 
Dependent variable Ln(Cites)  Ln(Cites)  Cites  Cites 
 
Original New  Original New  Original New  Original New 
IO 0.006*** 0.002  0.005*** 0.001  0.010*** 0  0.008*** -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Log(P) 
 
0.216***  
 
0.206***  
 
0.217***   0.274*** 
  
(0.062)  
 
(0.056)  
 
(0.077)   (0.073) 
Log(Sales) 0.568*** 0.523***  0.310*** 0.269***  0.820*** 0.781***  0.349*** 0.305** 
 
(0.037) (0.042)  (0.045) (0.048)  (0.042) (0.043)  (0.117) (0.125) 
Log(K/L) 0.433*** 0.473***  0.261*** 0.309***  0.483*** 0.537***  0.346** 0.396** 
 
(0.094) (0.096)  (0.085) (0.085)  (0.136) (0.146)  (0.165) (0.181) 
Log(RDC) 
  
 0.337*** 0.340***  
  
 0.493*** 0.477*** 
   
 (0.04) (0.04)  
  
 (0.14) (0.138) 
FE No No  No No  No No  No No 
Observations 4025 3903  4025 3903  6208 6034  6208 6034 
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(Table B1 cont.)            
AVZ column 5 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 8  
Model Poisson  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial  Negative Binomial 
Dependent variable Cites  Cites  Cites  Cites 
 
Original New  Original New  Original New  Original New 
IO 0.007*** -0.002  0.009*** 0.004*  0.008*** 0.003  0.006*** 0.003* 
 
(0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(Sales) 0.184*** 0.187***  0.493*** 0.399***  0.229*** 0.154**  0.127*** 0.080** 
 
(0.063) (0.066)  (0.047) (0.058)  (0.058) (0.066)  (0.037) (0.041) 
Log(K/L) 0.440*** 0.507***  0.613*** 0.632***  0.343*** 0.385***  0.264*** 0.301*** 
 
(0.132) (0.137)  (0.106) (0.103)  (0.087) (0.085)  (0.076) (0.076) 
Log(P) 
 
0.158***  
 
0.419***  
 
0.337***   0.161*** 
  
(0.051)  
 
(0.07)  
 
(0.061)   (0.049) 
Log(RDC) 0.009 -0.003  
  
 0.448*** 0.450***  0.178*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.107) (0.102)  
  
 (0.039) (0.039)  (0.029) (0.03) 
FE Yes Yes  No No  No No  Yes Yes 
Observations 6208 6034  6208 6034  6208 6034  6208 6034 
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Table B2: Product Market Competition, IO, and Innovation (AVZ Table 2)  
This table reproduces AVZ Table 2 (columns “Original”) along with share price P as an additional control variable (columns “New”). P is share 
price, PRCC_F, taken from Compustat for US firms. 
AVZ Caption: The dependent variable is future cite-weighted patents. Each column is a separate Poisson regression, as in AVZ Table 1, column 5. 
All regressions control for year dummies, ln(sales), ln(capital/labor), ln(R&D stock), four-digit industry dummies, and fixed effects using 
Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999) method. Standard errors are clustered at the three-digit industry level. Product market competition 
constructed as (1 − Lerner index) where Lerner is calculated as the median gross margin from the entire Compustat database in the firm’s three-
digit industry. Estimation period is 1991–1999 over 803 firms. High (low) market power industries are those where (1 −Lerner) is above (below) 
the sample median (0.871 for columns 3 and 4 and 0.877 in columns 7 and 8). 
 
AVZ column (1)  (2)  (5)  (6) 
Measure of competition Varies over time  Varies over time  Constant over time  Constant over time 
Sample Pooled  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
 Original New  Original New  Original New  Original New 
            
Log(P)  0.158
***
   0.159
***
   0.158***   0.159*** 
  (0.055)   (0.053)   (0.055)   (0.053) 
IO 0.007
***
 -0.002  -0.064
**
 0.007  0.007*** -0.002  -0.068** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.030) (0.023)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.028) (0.022) 
1 – Lerner 0.343 -0.218  -3.694 0.277       
 (2.329) (2.274)  (3.330) (2.803)       
IO * (1 – Lerner)    0.082** -0.010     0.087*** -0.007 
    (0.035) (0.026)     (0.033) (0.025) 
Observations 6208 6034  6208 6034  3123 3037  6208 6034 
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Table B2 (Cont.) 
AVZ column (3)  (4)  (7)  (8) 
Measure of competition Varies over time  Varies over time  Constant over time  Constant over time 
Sample High Competition  Low Competition  High Competition  Low Competition 
 
Original New  Original New  Original New  Original New 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Log(P)  0.166***   0.191   0.159***   0.234 
  (0.032)   (0.127)   (0.035)   (0.146) 
IO 0.009*** -0.001  0.002 -0.004  0.009*** -0.001  0 -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.004) 
1 – Lerner 4.668** 5.492**  1.376 1.049   
 
  
 
 
(2.31) (2.285)  (4.947) (4.349)   
 
  
 Observations 3085 2997  3123 3037  3125 3039  3083 2995 
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Table B3: Instrumental Variables (AVZ Table 5) 
This table reproduces AVZ Table 5 (columns “Original”) along with share price P as an additional control variable (columns “New”). P is share 
price, PRCC_F, taken from Compustat for US firms. 
AVZ Caption: All columns control for ln(sales), ln(capital/employment), four-digit industry dummies, and time dummies. Columns 7–10 also 
include the time-varying Lerner index. Estimation period is 1991–1999. S&P 500 is a dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a member of the 
S&P 500 Index. FE (Fixed effects) controls use the Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen (1999) method. Exogeneity test is a Hausman-based test. 
803 firms in full sample. “High (Low) Comp.” is the subsample where the industry (1−Lerner) is above (below) the sample median (0.871), as in 
Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level on columns 1–6 and at the three-digit industry level (as we are using competition 
information at this level) in columns 7–8. 
 
AVZ column (1) 
 
 2  
 
3  4  
   
 1st stage  2nd stage 2nd stage    
Dep. variable cites cites  IO  cites cites  cites cites 
 
Original New  Original  Original New  Original New 
IO 0.010*** 0.000  
 
 0.043*** 0.054  0.007*** -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003)  
 
 (0.012) (0.046)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Log(P) 
 
0.217***  
 
 
 
0.227***   0.160*** 
  
(0.077)  
 
 
 
(0.078)   (0.048) 
z_sp500 
  
 9.238***  
  
   
   
 (2.284)  
  
   
FE No No  No  No No  No No 
N 6208 6034  6208  6208 6034  6208 6034 
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Table B3 (Cont.) 
   
 
 
 
    
AVZ column 5 
 
6 
 
 
7 
High Comp Sample 
 8 
Low Comp. Sample 
 
1st stage  2nd stage 
 
    cites New 
Dep. variable IO  cites cites  cites   Original  
 
Original  Original New  Original New    
IO 
 
 0.029** -0.020  0.041*** 0.141***  0.016 0.022 
  
 (0.013) (0.043)  (0.006) (0.032)  (0.019) (0.031) 
Log(P) 
 
 
 
0.155***   0.169***   0.209 
  
 
 
(0.050)   (0.044)   (0.156) 
z_sp500 8.872***  
  
      
 
(2.352)  
  
      
FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 6208  6208 6034  3085 2997  3123 3037 
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